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THE FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT: WHY
THE CURRENT SPLIT INVOLVING THE
USE OF FORCE REQUIREMENT FOR
ATTEMPTED BANK ROBBERY IS REALLY
AN EXCEPTION
Paul R. Piaskoski*
The Federal Bank Robbery Act had been on the books for seventy years
by the time the federal appellate courts began to openly quarrel about the
necessary elements of attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of
the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Specifically, the circuits disagree as to whether
proof of actual force is required to sustain a conviction of attempted bank
robbery, or if attempted force is sufficient for a conviction. Legal scholars
have repeatedly framed this split in authority as a consequence of competing
methods of statutory interpretation. In this Comment, however, I argue that
it is neither a true split, nor the result of competing methods of interpretation.
In fact, a close examination of the case law reveals that in those instances
where the majority circuits have held that attempted force is sufficient for a
conviction, the courts are skipping the statutory analysis altogether. Further
scrutiny of the facts in each of the majority cases shows that this non-
canonical approach to statutory interpretation—or, more accurately, the
absence of an approach—only occurs when certain distinguishing facts are
present: (1) foreknowledge of the attempt by law enforcement; and (2) the
corresponding opportunity for law enforcement to intervene before
somebody gets hurt. As such, I contend the so-called split is more accurately
categorized as an exception to the statutorily prescribed actual force
* J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 2019. You are never
too old for mentors, and I have several I wish to thank: Professor Victoria Nourse for serving
as my comment advisor; the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen for taking the time to read it;
Professor Edward Fallone for setting me on this new path, and Professor Jody Marcucci for
JMON)M0O M)f 9Nr0K* rJ*/ )/ P1l )o/ UrU*h: ;)T-NT0 bf \+r'M) b*,f r0U !f]f \+roWklK b*,fh Q/+
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requirement, firmly rooted in one of the primary policy considerations
behind the passage and current enforcement of the Act: protecting innocent
bystanders from harm.
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B# Eo.’re s/ill in need6
Of something to read
Dere’s /"e s/orE o# 0onnie and ClEde:
—Bonnie Parker, &"e &rail’s Gnd
I. INTRODUCTION
Bonnie Elizabeth Parker and Clyde Chestnut Barrowwere about the age
of typical first-year law students, just twenty-one and twenty-two years old
respectively, when they embarked on their infamous bank-robbing spree in
the spring of 1932.1 9NTM+ Pq+MTQ T+r /Q qr0UM)+l: o/(JU Jr*) Q/+ JM))JT 1/+T
than two years, a period during which they robbed at least ten banks in five
Midwestern states, deliberately skirting the borders of those states to take
advantage of what was then an almost total lack of communication and
1 JEFF GUINN, GO DOWN TOGETHER: THE TRUE, UNTOLD STORY OF BONNIE & CLYDE 13
(establishing Clyde6s birthdate as March 24, 1910), 50 (establishing that Bonnie was
seventeen on January 1, 1928), 93 (establishing that the Barrow Gang committed its first
robbery on March 25, 1932) (2009).
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coordination among law enforcement in different jurisdictions.2 The tactic,
however, was hardly a trade secret, and at the time robbing banks was a
growth industry.3
In fact, the years between 1931 and 1935 are collectively referred to as
P9NT =(qJMW b0T1MT* b+rh: r )M1T U(+M0O oNMWN )NT 0(1qT+ /Q qr0K +/qqT+MT*
in the United States skyrocketed, thanks in no small part to a pantheon of
notorious gangsters carved from the unyielding granite of the Great
Depression: John Dillinger, Baby Face Nelson, and Pretty Boy Floyd, to
name a few.4 Many people saw these colorful criminals as folk heroes,
striking at the banks – the very institutions millions of Americans, including
some members of Congress, blamed for their sudden plunge into poverty.5
Bonnie and Clyde were no exception.6 The image of star-crossed young
lovers as avenging outlaws was as irresistible to the press and the public then
as it is now.7 Public opinion, however, began to turn as the body count rose.8
#) JTr*) 0M0T -/JMWT /QQMWT+* oT+T KMJJTU U(+M0O "/00MT r0U !JlUT6* *-+TTh M0
addition to several innocent civilians.9
"/00MT r0U !JlUT6* PQM0rJ +(0: Wr1T M0 Yrl I@FEh oNT0 M0'T*)MOr)/+*
who had studied their movements set up an ambush along a secluded country
2 Id. at 4 (PThis was one of Clyde6s regular tricksSlawmen from one state in pursuit of
criminals had no jurisdiction in any other.:).
3 American History: The Great Depression: Gangsters and G-Men, Guide for Library
Research on the Great Depression, JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIM. JUST.
http://guides.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/c.php?g=288390&p=1922564 [https://perma.cc/R6FM-Y79T]
(last visited Jan. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Gangsters and G-Men].
4 Id.; see also infra note 13; Crime in the Great Depression, HISTORY
https://www.history.com/topics/great-depression/crime-in-the-great-depression
[https://perma.cc/V2R2-8TAK] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (PAt the same time, colorful figures
like John Dillinger, Charles 8Pretty Boy6 Floyd, George 8Machine Gun6 Kelly, Clyde Barrow
and Bonnie Parker, 8Baby Face6 Nelson and 8Ma6 Barker and her sons were committing a
wave of bank robberies and other crimes across the country.:).
5 GUINN, supra note 1, at 4 (PMany Americans considered cops and bankers to be their
enemies.:); Subcommittee on Senate Resolutions 84 and 234, UNITED STATES SENATE
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Pecora.htm
[https://perma.cc/4KC3-2XX7] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (POn March 2, 1932, senators
passed Senate Resolution 84 authorizing the Committee on Banking and Currency to
investigate `practices with respect to the buying and selling and the borrowing and lending:
of stocks and securities.6:).
6 GUINN, supra note 1, at 4 (PStories about the BarrowGang invariably boosted newspaper
and magazine circulation.:).
7 Id.; see also Bryson Tiller, Bonnie & Clyde (2017).
8 GUINN, supra note 1, at 5 (PThe vicarious love affair between Americans and the Barrow
Gang was over.:).
9 GUINN, supra note 1, at 3–5.
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road in Bienville Parish, Louisiana.10 Like many of their hapless victims, the
young outlaws never stood a chance. When their stolen Ford Deluxe finally
appeared, police opened fire on the vehicle with Thompson submachine
guns, and they continued firing until they ran out of bullets.11 Bonnie Parker
and Clyde Barrow were both killed, the coroner later determining that each
*(QQT+TU P1r0l -/)T0)MrJJl Qr)rJ o/(0U*f:12
"/00MT r0U !JlUT6* O+M*Jl r0U OJr1/+MkTU *)/+l M* 0/) /0Jl
representative of the broader criminal trend of the time, but also encapsulates
the specific policy considerations behind the passage of the Bank Robbery
Act later that same summer: ending the bloodshed, and eliminating the
exploitable jurisdictional weaknesses between states.13
In the years since, the Act has provided a comprehensive scheme for
prosecuting and penalizing those who steal from a federally insured bank.14
The statute encompasses the underlying crimes of entering with felonious
intent, robbery, petit and grand larceny, and receiving property stolen from a
bank.15
b'T0 )/Urlh )NT aTUT+rJ "(+Tr( /Q ^0'T*)MOr)M/06* jPa"^:i *)r)TU
priority in terms of enforcing the Bank Robbery Act reflects these
foundational policy considerations of safeguarding the public and closing the
L(+M*UMW)M/0rJ Or-*? Pu9NT a"^t Q/W(*T* M)* M0'T*)MOr)M'T +T*/(+WT* /0 )N/*T
suspects who pos[e] the greatest threats to the public, including the most
violent and/or the most prolific serial offenders who often cross jurisdictional
q/(0Ur+MT*f:16
However, it is now said that a split exists among the federal circuits
regarding the necessary elements of attempted bank robbery as prescribed by
the Act. The split specifically concerns the use of force, violence or
intimidation under the first paragraph of § 2113(a), which reads in relevant
part:
10 Id. at 334–37.
11 Id. at 338–41.
12 Id. at 345.
13 78 CONG. REC. 8148, 6609 (1934), available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
CRECB-1934-pt6-v78/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1934-pt6-v78-12-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LBU8-
LD9L] (PBy this legislation we hope to curb the activities of gangsters and racketeers, and to
give the public more adequate protection against their depredations.:).
14 See generally Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C.. § 2113 (2018).
15 Id.
16 What We Investigate: Bank Robbery, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/bank-robbery [https://perma.cc/6F6A-VEWK]
(last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
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Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the
person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property
or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control,
management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.17
As typically presented, the controversy centers entirely on the first
thirteen words of § GIIFjrih r0U oNT)NT+ )NT o/+U Pr))T1-)*: r--JMT*
excl(*M'TJl )/ )NT o/+U P)rKTh: /+ MQ M) rJ*/ +TrWNT* qrWK M0 )NT *T0)T0WT )/
1/UMQl )NT o/+U* PQ/+WTh: P'M/JT0WTh: r0U PM0)M1MUr)M/0f:18 The difference
is dispositive in terms of the required elements of the crime. Under the
0r++/oT+ +TrUM0Oh oNT+T Pr))T1-)*: /0Jl 1/UMQMT* P)rKTh: )NT O/'T+01T0)
must show and prove that the defendant used actual force and violence, or
intimidation to gain a conviction.19 Under the broader reading, where
Pr))T1-)*: 1/UMQMT* )NT Q/+WT WJr(*T M0 rUUM)M/0 )/ )NT o/+U P)rKTh: M0 /rder
to convict, the government must only prove that the defendant attempted to
use force and violence, or intimidationSa significantly lower hurdle.20 The
Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that the word
Pr))T1-)*: /0Jl 1/UMQMT* )NT o/+U P)rKTh: r* r -JrM0 +TrUM0O /Q )NT *)r)()T
suggests, and accordingly, that the government must show and prove actual
force and violence or intimidation in order to sustain a conviction of
attempted bank robbery.21 On the other hand, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits have all held that attempted force is sufficient for a
conviction.22
17 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
18 Id.
19 See cases cited infra note 21.
20 See cases cited infra note 22.
21 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (PActual force and
violence or intimidation is required for a conviction under the first paragraph of § 2113(a).:);
United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2004) (PWe find the 8actual act of
intimidation6 reading to be the most natural reading of the text.:); United States v. Baker, 129
F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (PIt is apparent that in the statute under consideration the
8attempt6 relates to the taking and not to the intimidation.:).
22 United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that actual intimidation
is not required to prove attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of the statute); United
States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a conviction for attempted bank
robbery requires government to prove culpable intent and conduct constituting substantial step
towards commission of crime); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984)
(holding that § 2113(a) does not require that actual force and violence or intimidation
accompany the attempt); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that
bank robbery was in progress is not essential to conviction of attempted bank robbery); United
States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976) (PWe reject this wooden logic.:).
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Legal scholars have repeatedly framed this controversy as a
W/0*T,(T0WT /Q PW/0QJMW)M0O 1T)N/U* /Q *)r)()/+l M0)T+-+T)r)M/0h: r+O(M0O
that a reading of the first paragraph of § 2113(a) whereby the word
Pr))T1-)*: rJ*/ 1/UMQMT* )NT o/+U* PQ/+WTh: P'M/JT0WTh: r0U PM0)M1MUr)M/0:
M* M1-JMWM) M0 )NT 1rL/+M)l6* UTWM*M/0*f23 However, this framing presupposes
that the majority is, in fact, engaged in statutory interpretation.24 A closer
examination of the case law reveals they are not.25 Accordingly, in this
Comment, I argue that the so-called split among the circuits is really an
exception, the triggering circumstances for which are: (1) at least some
foreknowledge of the crime by law enforcement; and (2) the corresponding
opportunity for law enforcement to intervene before innocent bystanders are
put at risk.26 I further argue that the clear policy consideration girding the
1rL/+M)l6* UTWM*M/0* M* /0T /Q )NT -+M1r+l W/0*MUT+rtions invoked in the
passage and current enforcement of the Act: neutralizing threats to the
public.27
In Part II, I trace the legislative history of the Bank Robbery Act and
diagram its present construction. In Part III, I establish a threshold distinction
between statutory interpretation and statutory application (or construction)
before chronologically illustrating the majority and minority decisions from
the federal circuits. I also survey the generally accepted definitions of a true
circuit split, and explain why the so-called split involving the first paragraph
of § 2113(a) of the Bank Robbery Act is really an exception. In Part IV, I
Tm-J/+T )NT 'r+M/(* orl* M0 oNMWN )NT 1rL/+M)l6* 'rJMU -/JMWl W/0*MUT+r)M/0*
might be harmonized with the letter of the law, and in Part V, I offer my
specific recommendation for doing so.
23 E.g., Jennifer M. Lota, Analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) of the Federal Bank Robbery
Act: Achieving Safety and Upholding Precedent Through Statutory Amendment, 7 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. 445, 448 (2011), (PUltimately, the split has resulted from circuit courts6
application of conflicting methods of statutory interpretation.:); see also Michael Rizzo, The
Need to Apply the >Plain Meaning, Rule to the First Paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is
>Plain,: A Bank Robber Must Have Used Actual Force and Violence or Intimidation, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 227, 229 (2009) (PThe reason for the circuit court split lies in the contrasting
approaches to statutory interpretation.:).
24 See discussion infra Part III.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See discussion infra Part II.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BANK ROBBERY ACT
The Bank Robbery Act made robbing or attempting to rob a bank a
federal offense, but according to the Record of the Seventy-Third Congress,
there was some initial resistance to the idea on the part of the House Judiciary
Committee.28 Prior to 1934, bank robbery had been considered strictly a state
law crime, and some lawmakers believed that federalizing the offense would
M0Q+M0OT /0 )NT P-/JMWT -/oT+* /Q )NT *)r)T*f:29 Ironically, it was John
Dillinger who managed to whip up the necessary votes.30 In April 1934, just
as lawmakers were debating the change, Dillinger went on a violent tear,
raiding a police armory in Indiana, shooting his way out of an FBI trap at the
Little Bohemia Lodge near Rhinelander, Wisconsin (one FBI agent was
killed), and engaging in a second gun battle and high speed chase with federal
agents in Minnesota.31 According to the congressional record, opposition to
oNr) o/(JU qTW/1T )NT "r0K </qqT+l #W) )NT0 POr'T orl: (0UT+ oM)NT+M0O
-(qJMW +TrW)M/0 )/ P)NT Tm-J/M)* /Q )NT T*Wr-TU W/0'MW) ]/N0 xMJJM0OT+f:32 On
May 18, 1932, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed six of the anti-
crime bills recommended by then-Attorney General Homer Cummings,
28 CQResearcher, Record of the Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session, Anti-Crime and
Anti-Lynching Legislation, CQ PRESS, https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/
document.php?id=cqresrre1934061900#H2_9 [https://perma.cc/QFD2-B6BC] (last visited
Jan. 22, 2019):
The bills encountered opposition in the House Judiciary Committee on the ground that,
while purporting to forward federal-state cooperation in the suppression of crime, many
of the bills constituted invasions by the federal government of police powers of the
states. This opposition gave way toward the end of April under pressure of the public
reaction to the exploits of the escaped convict, John Dillinger.
Id.
29 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102–03 (1943) (providing a brief early history
of the Act).
30 CQ Researcher, supra note 28.
31 History: Famous Cases & Criminals: John Dillinger, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/john-dillingerhttps://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-
cases/john-dillinger [https://perma.cc/9RMJ-LPSR] (last visited March 9, 2019) (PDillinger
and Van Meter robbed a police station at Warsaw, Indiana of guns and bulletproof vests . . . .
The agents spread out to surround the lodge and as they approached, machine gun fire rattled
down on them from the roof.:); Robert Cloud, Taken Hostage by Gangsters: Peterson’s Latest
Book about John Dillinger, WAUPACA COUNTY NEWS (June 23, 2016)
https://www.waupacanow.com/2016/06/23/taken-hostage-by-gangsters/
[https://perma.cc/HY8H-XDKL] (PFederal agents and area police hunted for Dillinger and his
gang. They were spotted in Johnson6s car near Hastings, Minnesota. A 20-mile high speed
chase ensued.:).
32 CQ Researcher, supra note 28.
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including measures that made it a federal offense to rob a Federal Reserve
member bank, or to transport stolen goods, including money, across state
lines.33 Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2113, the statute brought such offenses
directly under the purview of the newly designated FBI.34 The concrete
sanctuary that ethereal state lines once provided marauding gangsters
'r0M*NTU oM)N )NT *)+/KT /Q ax<6* -T0h r0U */ )// UMU )NT *T+MrJ KMJJM0O )Nr)
frequently accompanied such crimes.35 The Public Enemies Era was over,
but the debate over the language and effectiveness of the Act was just
beginning.36
In fact, by 1937, it was clear the Bank Robbery Act needed some
tweaking.37 As originally constructed, the Act applied only to P+/qqT+lh
robbery accompanied by an aggravated assault, and homicide perpetrated in
W/11M))M0O r +/qqT+l /+ T*Wr-M0O )NT+TrQ)T+f:38 Given the sort of violent
collateral damage described above, and the concerns of some lawmakers
regarding federal overreach, one can certainly understand why the statute was
narrowly tailored to address only the most serious and violent offenses.
Nevertheless, by 1937, Attorney General Cummings urged Congress to
broaden the language of the Act to include lesser crimes against banks, such
as larceny.39 To illustrate the need, Cummings cited one case in particular,
in which a man was caught red-handed trying to walk out of a bank with
thousands of dollars in stolen money, but escaped prosecution under the Act
because he did not usT PQ/+WT r0U 'M/JT0WTh /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0f:40 Congress
responded by adding larceny, and entering a bank with the intent to commit
Pr0l QTJ/0l: )/ )NT *r1T -r+rO+r-N )Nr) rJ+TrUl W/'T+TU +/qqT+l r0U
attempted robbery under § 2113(a), but without making any changes to the
penalty.41
Unfortunately, this oversight involving the penalty meant the severity
of the punishmentStwenty years in prisonSdid not always match the
severity of the crime.42 Justice was clearly not served when an opportunistic
33 Id.
34 History: The FBI and the American Gangster, 1924–1938, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history/the-fbi-and-the-american-gangster
[https://perma.cc/8DRS-CVSR] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
35 Gangsters and G-Men, supra note 3.
36 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102–03 (1943).
37 Id. at 103 (PThe fact that the 1934 statute was limited to robbery was said to have
produced 8some incongruous results.6:).
38 Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 325–27 (1957).
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defendant who merely grabbed a handful of money from the drawer when
the teller was not looking was punished with the same severity as a gun-toting
gangster on a multi-state tour of murder and mayhem.43 Soin 1948, Congress
further tweaked the statute, moving the larceny provision out of § 2113(a)
and into its own section, § 2113(b).44 Congress also assigned lesser, tiered
-T0rJ)MT* qr*TU /0 )NT r1/(0) /Q P-+/-T+)l /+ 1/0Tl: )rKT0 Q+/1 )NT qr0K?
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money
or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both;
or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money
or any other thing of value not exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both.45
Finally, lawmakers split § 2113(a) into two paragraphs, the first dealing
with robbery and attempted robbery, and the second dealing specifically with
unlawful entry.46
In 1986, lawmakers amended the Act yet again, adding the phrase
P/q)rM0* /+ r))T1-)* )/ /q)rM0 ql Tm)/+)M/0: )/ )NT QM+*) -r+rO+r-N /Q
§ 2113(a).47
B. A TALE OF TWO PARAGRAPHS
As it reads today, the first paragraph of § 2113(a) deals specifically with
bank robbery and attempted bank robbery, whereas the second paragraph
-T+)rM0* *-TWMQMWrJJl )/ r0l/0T oN/ T0)T+* r qr0K PoM)N M0)T0) )/ W/11M) . . .
r0l QTJ/0lf:48
43 Prince, 352 U.S. at 326 (noting P[t]he larceny penalties were set according to the degree
of the offense:).
44 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2006); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 796 (1948) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
45 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b).
46 See, Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, § 2113, 62 Stat. 796 (1948) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
47 Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–646, 100 Stat 3592 (PSection 2113 (a) of title 18,
United States Code, is amended by inserting 8, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion6
after 8from the person or presence of another.6:) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-281).
48 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)–(b).
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Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the
person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property
or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control,
management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a
savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in
such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony
affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation
of any statute of the United States, or any larcenyS
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.49
Defendants accused of actually robbing a bank, or attempting to rob a
bank, are typically charged under the first paragraph of § 2113(a).50 Whereas
defendants who enter a bank with the intention of robbing it, but are
somehow frustrated in the attempt, are typically chargedSand face the same
maximum penalty of twenty years in prisonSunder the second paragraph of
the statute.51 As we shall see, application of this particular statute becomes
somewhat controversial when defendants with the requisite intent are
arrested before they enter, or attempt to enter a bank.52
Also note, Congress has had plenty of bites at this particular apple,
tweaking the language of the Act several times over the course of several
decades and stratifying the penalties to match the severity of specific
crimes.53 Although the text of the first paragraph of § 2113(a) is arguably
(0r1qMO(/(*h !/0O+T**6 UT1/0*)+r)TU 'MOMJr0WT oMJJ qTW/1T r0 M1portant
point as we attempt to divine legislative intent and purpose, specifically with
regard to the first paragraph of § 2113(a).54
III. ARGUMENT
I acknowledge at the outset that many legal theorists tend to use
statutory interpretation and statutory application (or construction)
49 Id.
50 See e.g., United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2016).
51 Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957) (PIt is a fair inference from the
wording in the Act . . . that the unlawful entry provision was inserted to cover the situation
where a person enters a bank for the purpose of committing a crime, but is frustrated for some
reason before completing the crime.:); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b).
52 See infra Part III.
53 See supra Part II.
54 See infra Part III.
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interchangeably.55 Textualists in particular believe that interpretation and
construction are intertwined, with construction constrained by
interpretation.56 Intentionalists and purposovists, on the other hand, believe
that semantic meaning can and should give way to other considerations such
as legislative intent, or, as is likely here, objective statutory purpose.57 A full
exploration of this debate is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, for
purposes of the argument that follows, I consider statutory interpretation and
statutory application to be necessarily distinct.58 Interpretation refers to the
process that recognizes or discovers the linguistic meaning or semantic
content of the text, whereas construction refers to the process that gives the
text legal effect, in other words, application of the statute.59
To borrow an analogy from civil procedure, taken as true, this
distinction allows for the plausible inference on which my larger claimSthat
the split is really an exceptionSrests: the notion that statutory interpretation
is not M1-JMWM) M0 )NT 1rL/+M)l6* r--JMWr)M/0 /Q & 2113(a).60 Instead, I argue
that the majority is reaching conclusions about the semantic meaning of the
text based on policy considerations, effectively Pr+O(M0O Q/+ )NT TmM*)T0WT /Q
r QrW) Q+/1 M)* UT*M+rqMJM)lf:61 As legal scholar Lawrence Solum explains,
PuotNT0 )NM* Nr--T0*h )NT M0)T+-+T)r)M/0-construction distinction allows us to
+TW/0*)+(W) )NT r+O(1T0)* */ )Nr) )NTl 1rKT *T0*Th /+h MQ )NTl U/06)h )hen in a
orl )Nr) Tm-/*T* )NT T++/+f:62 This is the aim of the analysis that follows.
55 Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-
Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1993) (noting that
P[m]ost often interpretation and construction are used as synonyms.:).
56 Lawrence B. Solum, Construction and Constraint: Discussion of Living Originalism, 7
JERUSALEM REV. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (2013) (noting that P[s]ome originalists may endorse
versions of the principle that provide very strong constraint; others may accept weaker forms
of constraint.:).
57 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23–24
(2006) (PWhen judges search for underlying purposes based on anything other than statutory
text, textualists argued, judges elevate not only their own policy preferences, but also the
preferences of one legislator over another.:).
58 Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95 (2010) (P[T]he distinction is both real and fundamental--that it marks a deep
difference in two different stages (or moments) in the way that legal and political actors
process legal texts.:).
59 Id. at 96.
60 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6).
61 Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Apr. 27, 2008 11:08AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/
2008/04/legal-theory--6.html [https://perma.cc/4KTB-HSFE].
62 Id.
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A. THE MAJORITY CASES: ATTEMPTED FORCE IS SUFFICIENT
As noted above, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all
held that establishing an attempted use of forceSas opposed to the actual use
of forceSis sufficient for a conviction of attempted bank robbery under the
first paragraph of § 2113(a).
United States v. Baker, a 1955 case from the Southern District of
California, was the first case in any court to directly address the use of force
requirement for attempted bank robbery, and therefore serves as a common
ancestor of sorts when tracing the lineage of the current controversy.63 The
defendant in Baker, an intoxicated man named Elvin Cyril Baker, was
accused of trying to rob the Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank of Los
Angeles.64 He entered the bank and handed the teller a largely incoherent
0/)Th r**(+M0O NT+ )NT+T Po/06) qT r0l )+/(qJTh: */ J/0O r* *NT UMU oNr) NT
was asking, although it was far from clear what that might be.65 The note
+TrUh P=JTr*T WNTWK rJJh M0)/ )NM* *rWKh 9Nr0K l/( b!"f:66 Erring on the side
of caution, the confused teller triggered the silent alarm and Baker was
quickly apprehended.67 9NT Wr*T )(+0TU /0 oNT)NT+ "rKT+6* 0/)T r0U qrief
conversation with the teller amounted to actual intimidation under the Act. 68
The court held that it did, and, without explicitly acknowledging as much,
r--Tr+* )/ Nr'T ()MJMkTU r -JrM0 1Tr0M0O r0rJl*M* /Q )NT *)r)()Th 0/)M0Oh PuMt)
is apparent that [in the first paragraph of § GIIFjrit )NT sr))T1-)6 +TJr)T* )/
)NT s)rKM0O6 r0U 0/) )/ )NT sM0)M1MUr)M/0f6:69 The district court further held
that where intimidation is relied upon to establish a crime, it must be shown
by proof of conduct or words.70
Twenty-three years after Baker, the Second Circuit laid the groundwork
Q/+ )NT 1rL/+M)l6* -/*M)M/0 M0 United States v. Stallworth.71 In Stallworth, the
court held that proof of actual force and violence, or intimidation was not
necessary for a conviction of attempted bank robbery, even though the
defendants in the case had been convicted under the second paragraph of
§ 2113(a)Sattempting unlawful entry of a bank with the intent of
63 United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Cal. 1955).




68 Id. (finding that the P[d]efendant intended to get money from the teller by
intimidation:).
69 Id. at 686.
70 Id.
71 United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976).
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committing a felonySand not the first.72 Clarence Stallworth was one of
five defendants who planned to rob a bank in Queens, New York, unaware
that the FBI had the entire group under constant video and audio surveillance
for nearly two weeks prior, and that one member of the group was, in fact,
an FBI informant.73
While still under surveillance, the defendants pulled up in front of the
bank armed with guns and wearing ski masks, but were arrested before they
even had a chance to get out of the car.74 The defendants in Stallworth argued
that they could not be convicted of attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a)
qTWr(*T )NTl NrU P0TM)NT+ T0)T+TU )NT qr0K 0/+ q+r0UM*NTU urt oTr-/0utf:75
They admitted to conspiracy to commit the robbery, which carried a possible
five-year prison term, but, similar to Baker, the defendants argued that
because thel NrU 0/) (*TU rW)(rJ PQ/+WT r0U 'M/JT0WTh /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0h: )NTl
could not be convicted of attempted bank robbery and should not face a
possible twenty-year prison term under the language of the Act.76 The
Second Circuit flatly rejected this argumentSand )NT W/(+)6* +Tr*/0M0O M0
BakerSr* Po//UT0 J/OMWf:77
To be clear, in Stallworth, the Second Circuit never actually engaged in
statutory interpretation, and the court conducted no textual analysis
whatsoever.78 Instead, the court launched immediately into an exploration of
)NT W/11/0 Jro UTQM0M)M/0 /Q r))T1-)? PM0)T0) )/ W/11M) r W+M1Th )NT
execution of an overt act in furtherance of the intention, and a failure to
W/0*(11r)T )NT W+M1Tf:79 9NT W/(+) )NT0 *T))JTU /0 )NT aMQ)N !M+W(M)6*
+TJr)M'TJl 0To P*(q*)r0)MrJ *)T-: r0rJl*M* Q/+ M0WN/r)T W+M1T*h qr*TU /0 r
UTQM0M)M/0 /Q r))T1-) P-+/QQT+TU: ql #1T+MWr0 [ro ^0*)M)()T6* Y/UTJ =T0rJ
!/UT jPY=!:if80 70UT+ )NT *(q*)r0)MrJ *)T- r0rJl*M*h r PUTQT0Ur0) 1(*) Nr'T
engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission
/Q )NT W+M1Th: W/0U(W) )Nr) M* P*)+/0OJl W/++/q/+r)M'T /Q )NT QM+10T** /Q )NT
UTQT0Ur0)6* W+M1M0rJ M0)T0)f:81 In holding that proof of attempted force or
M0)M1MUr)M/0 or* *(QQMWMT0) )/ rQQM+1 )NT UM*)+MW) W/(+)6* W/0'MW)M/0 Q/+
72 Id. at 1041 (holding that P[b]ecause the conduct of Stallworth and Sellers constituted an
attempted bank robbery, the conviction must be affirmed:).
73 Id. at 1039.




78 See generally Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038.
79 Id. at 1040.
80 Id. (citing United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974)).
81 Id. at 1040.
688 PIASKOSKI [Vol. 109
attempteU qr0K +/qqT+lh )NT ;TW/0U !M+W(M) 0/)TU )NT P+r)M/0rJ -/JMWT* /Q )NT
r))T1-) U/W)+M0Th:82 r0U *)+T**TU )NT QrW) )Nr) Jro T0Q/+WT1T0)6* P)M1TJl
M0)T+'T0)M/0: NrU P-+/qrqJl -+T'T0)TU . . . bloodshed in an area crowded
oM)N 0//0)M1T *N/--T+*f:83
One year later, in United States v. Jackson, a defendant came before the
Second Circuit who had been convicted specifically under the first paragraph
of § 2113(a).84 However, instead of looking to BakerSthe only other
reported case to date in which the defendant had also been convicted under
the first paragraph85Sthe Second Circuit opted to follow Stallworth, a case
in which the defendants had been convicted under the second paragraph.86
Notwithstanding this misplaced reliance, Jackson and Stallworth are
factually very similar.87
In Jackson, the FBI knew ahead of time via an informant when the
robbery was scheduled to take place, and had pre-positioned agents outside
the bank on the prescribed day.88 The defendants, however, after circling and
scouting the banK Q/+ 1(WN /Q )NT 1/+0M0Oh PUT)TW)TU )NT -+T*T0WT: /Q )NT
agents and tried to speed off.89 The agents gave chase, stopping the vehicle,
and taking all three defendants into custody several blocks from the bank.90
Guns, masks, and handcuffs were found inside the car, and all three
defendants would later admit to, and be convicted of, conspiracy to commit
bank robbery.91
At trial and on appeal, however, the defendants challenged a second
count of attempted bank robbery and the much harsher penalty it carriedS
twenty years in prison.92 Citing Baker, the defendants argued that P*M0WT u)NT
first paragraph of § 2113(a)] only mentions attempted taking and not
r))T1-)TU Q/+WTh 'M/JT0WTh /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0h: M) WJTr+Jl Q/JJ/o* )Nr) )NT
government must prove actual use of force, violence, or intimidation in order
to sustain their convictions.93 In response, the Second Circuit once again
ignored Baker r0U -+/0/(0WTU )NT UTQT0Ur0)*6 QM+*)-paragraph argument
82 Id. at 1041.
83 Id.
84 United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977).
85 United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
86 Jackson, 560 F.2d at 113 (PThis troublesome question was recently examined by this
court in United States v. Stallworth . . . which set forth the applicable legal principles.:).
87 Id.




92 Id. at 116.
93 Id.
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PQ/+TWJ/*TU: ql )NT N/JUM0O M0 Stallworth, even though the defendants in
Stallworth had been charged specifically under the second paragraph of
§ 2113(a).94 Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that proof of attempted
force, violence or intimidation was sufficient to uphold the conviction.95 The
Jackson court then conducted a substantial step analysis, finding that the
UTQT0Ur0)* rW)TU PoM)N )NT KM0U /Q W(J-rqMJM)l /)NT+oM*T +T,(M+TU Q/+ )NT
W/11M**M/0 /Q )NT W+M1Th: r0U )Nr) )NTl PT0OrOTU M0 W/0U(W) oNMWN
constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crimTf:96 The
convictions for attempted bank robbery were affirmed.97
Just as in Stallworth, however, the Jackson court failed to conduct any
direct analysis of the statutory text whatsoever. Instead, the court declared
M)*TJQ PM0 T0)M+T rWW/+U: oM)N )NT q+/rUer policy consideration cited in
Stallworth? )Nr) )NT UTQM0M)M/0 /Q r))T1-) /(ON) qT /0T )Nr) PT0rqJT* */WMT)l
to punish malefactors who have unequivocally set out upon a criminal course
without requiring law enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders
r+T M1-T+MJTUf:98
In 1984, the Fourth Circuit also addressed the force requirement under
the first paragraph of § 2113(a) in United States v. McFadden.99 In
McFadden, the two defendants had already robbed three banks in South
Carolina and were about to rob a fourth, but thanks to an inside informant
and ongoing surveillance, the FBI captured them before they could retrieve
a bag of weapons stashed near the bank and enter the building.100
Citing Baker, the defendants argued that under the first paragraph of
§ 2113(ai PurW)(rJt Q/+WT r0U 'M/JT0WT /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0 1(*) rWW/1-r0l )NT
r))T1-)f:101 xTQT0Ur0)* Q(+)NT+ r+O(TU )Nr) PqTWr(*T )NT+T or* 0/ (*T /Q
Q/+WT r* +T,(M+TU ql )NT W/0)+/JJM0O *)r)()Th: )NTM+ W/0'MW)M/0* (0UT+ )NT QM+*)
paragraph of § 2113(a) should be overturned.102
The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, assertingSwithout
explanationSthat Baker *M1-Jl UMU 0/) P*(--/+) r--TJJr0)*6 -/*M)M/0f:103
94 Id. at 117.
95 Id. at 117 (PWe conclude that Scott6s argument [that actual force is required] is
foreclosed by this Stallworth holding, with which we are in entire accord.:).
96 Id. at 116.
97 Id. at 121.
98 Id. at 117 (PWe conclude that Scott6s argument is foreclosed by this Stallworth
holding.:).
99 United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984).
100 Id. at 151.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 150.
103 Id. at 151–52.
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Instead, the court cited to Stallworth and Jackson, and, just as the Second
Circuit had done, skipped the textual analysis of the controlling statute.104
70UT+ )NT Y=!6* *(q*)r0)MrJ *)T- r0rJl*M*h )NT McFadden court then held
that proof of attempted force and violence or intimidation was sufficient for
a conviction of attempted bank robbery, and accordingly, the convictions
were affirmed.105
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Moore,
holding that a conviction under the first paragraph of § GIIFjri P+T,(M+T*
only that the defendant intended to use force, violence or intimidation and
mrUT r *(q*)r0)MrJ *)T- )/or+U W/0*(11r)M0O )NT +/qqT+lf:106 The FBI had
arrested the defendant, Earnest Moore, as he approached a bank in Oregon
oM)N r J/rUTU Nr0UO(0 PW/0WTrJTU M0 )NT orM*)qr0U /Q NM* )+/(*T+*h: oTr+M0O
a ski mask, and carrying two empty pillowcases.107. Just as in the previous
cases, the FBI had an inside informant and, through that informant, furnished
the actual vehicle to be used in the robbery.108 Moore argued that the
government could not prove a necessary element of attempted bank
robberySactual force and violence, or intimidationSbecause he was
arrested before he entered the bank.109
In what was now becoming a familiar refrain, the Ninth Circuit rejected
that argument, ignored the controlling statute, and instead cited to Jackson,
empha*MkM0O )NT 0/)M/0 )Nr) r W/0'MW)M/0 Q/+ r))T1-)TU qr0K +/qqT+l PU/T*
0/) +T,(M+T )NT rW)(rJ (*T /Q Q/+WTh 'M/JT0WT /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0f:110 The Ninth
Circuit further affirmed the underlying policy consideration driving the
W/(+)6* r0rJl*M*? )NT 0/)M/0 )Nr) Pu-tolice are not required to delay arrest until
M00/WT0) ql*)r0UT+* r+T M1-T+MJTUf:111
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit joined the majority circuits with its decision
in United States v. Wesley.112 Wesley is similar to the other majority cases in
that police had an inside informant and were conducting video, audio, and
telephone surveillance of the defendant, Donyal Wesley.113 Wesley is
distinct, however, in that the defendant was not anywhere in the vicinity of
104 Id. at 152.
105 Id. at 153.
106 United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 208.
109 Id. at 209.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005).
113 Id. at 615–16.
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the bank when he was arrested.114 #UUM)M/0rJJlh P0/ rWW/1-Jices were
-+T*T0) r0U 0/ oTr-/0* /+ UM*O(M*T* oT+T Q/(0Uf:115 Wesley is further
distinguished by the fact that by the time the case was in front of the Sixth
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit had already created the split, holding in United
States v. Bellew that a most natural reading of the first paragraph of § 2113(a)
does, in fact, require proof of actual force and violence or intimidation to
sustain a conviction for attempted bank robbery.116 In Wesley, the Sixth
Circuit acknowledged the nascent split, but rejected the newly minted
1M0/+M)l 'MTo r0U )NT UTQT0Ur0)6* r+O(1T0)f117 Citing to Stallworth,
Jackson, McFadden, and Moore, the Wesley court noted that the Fifth
!M+W(M)6* M0)T+-+T)r)M/0 /Q )NT *)r)()TS)Nr) Pr))T1-) +TJr)T* /0Jl )/ )NT )rKM0O
and not the intimiUr)M/0: SNrU qTT0 P*,(r+TJl +TLTW)TU ql )N+TT /)NT+
WM+W(M)*f:118 9NT W/(+) oT0) /0 )/ or+0 )Nr) P)/ +TrU )NT *)r)()T r* UTQT0Ur0)
(+OT* o/(JU qT M0W/0*M*)T0) oM)N /(+ UTQM0M)M/0 /Q r))T1-) W+M1T*h: r0U )NT0
NTJU )Nr) PurtW)(rJ M0)M1MUr)M/0 M* 0/) +T,(M+TU to prove attempted bank
robbery under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § GIIFjrif: 119 In this respect,
Wesley is also distinct; it is the only majority case in which the court
explicitly mentions the controlling statute in its analysis.120 However, instead
of engaging in any meaningful analysis of the semantic meaning of
§ 2113(a), theWesley court appears to adopt the same policy-driven premise
OM+UM0O TrWN /Q )NT /)NT+ 1rL/+M)l UTWM*M/0*? P#))T1-) M* r *(q)JT W/0WT-) )Nr)
requires a rational and logically sound definition, one that enables society to
punish malefactors who have unequivocally set out upon a criminal course
without requiring law enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders
r+T M1-T+MJTUf:121
B. THE MINORITY CASES: ACTUAL FORCE IS NECESSARY
Utilizing a plain meaning analysis of the Bank Robbery Act, the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits have held that proof of actual force and violence, or
114 Id. at 616.
115 Id.
116 United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that Pto prove a
violation of bank robbery statute on theory that defendant, by force and violence or by
intimidation, took or attempted to take money or other property from bank, it is not enough
for government to show that defendant attempted to engage in act of intimidation:).
117 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 617.
118 Id. at 618.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United
States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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intimidation is necessary for a conviction of attempted bank robbery under
the first paragraph of § 2113(a).122
As noted above, the Fifth Circuit spurned the majority and openly
created a split in authority with its 2004 decision inUnited States v. Bellew.123
In Bellewh )NT aMQ)N !M+W(M) +T'T+*TU )NT UTQT0Ur0)6* W/0'MW)M/0 Q/+ r))T1-)TU
bank +/qqT+lh N/JUM0O )Nr) (0UT+ r P0r)(+rJ +TrUM0O: /Q )NT QM+*) -r+rO+r-N /Q
§ 2113(a), the government must prove actual use of force and violence, or
intimidation.124 Bryon Worley Bellew had been convicted of attempted
robbery in the Eastern District of Texas after entering and then leaving a bank
in Plano twice in the same day while wearing a wig and carrying a firearm in
a briefcase.125 On his third trip to the bank, police attempted to arrest Bellew
in the parking lot, where he quickly removed the gun from the briefcase and
put it to his own head.126 A standoff ensued, and three hours later, Bellew
finally surrendered and admitted that it was his intention all along to rob the
bank.127 Bellew would later argue, however, that the evidence against him
was insufficient to support a conviction of attempted bank robbery under the
first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § GIIFjri qTWr(*T NT NrU 0/) (*TU PQ/+WT r0U
'M/JT0WTh /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0: /0 r0l/0T q() NM1*TJQf128
X/)M0O )Nr) )NT T'MUT0WT M0 )NT Wr*T or* PJr+OTJl (0UM*-()TUh: )Ne Fifth
Circuit would telegraph its approach by reframing the key question in the
Wr*T? PoNT)NT+ )NT +TJT'r0) *)r)()/+l Jr0O(rOT (-/0 oNMWN )NT M0UMW)1T0) M*
based, the first paragraph of § 2113(a), requires an actual act of intimidation
or only attempted M0)M1MUr)M/0 Q/+ r W/0'MW)M/0f:129 In answering that
question, the Fifth Circuit conducted a plain meaning analysis of the first
-r+rO+r-N r0U UT)T+1M0TU )Nr)h (0UT+ )NT P1/*) 0r)(+rJ +TrUM0O /Q )NT )Tm)h:
proof of actual force and violence or intimidation was necessary for a
122 United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 450 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Thornton,
539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008).
123 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 450.
124 Id at 454 (PWe find the 8actual act of intimidation6 reading to be the most natural
reading of the text.:).
125 Id. at 451–52.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 452–53 (PWhen confronted by the police at his vehicle, Bellew reached into his
briefcase and retrieved a firearm. He promptly put the weapon to his own head. . . . [T]he
government did not point to any evidence that showed that Bellew committed any act of
intimidation.:); Brief for Appellant at 16, United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir.
2004) (No. 03-40444), 2003 WL 23858861, at *16 (PThese actions do not constitute
intimidating behavior by any stretch of the imagination.:).
129 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 452.
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conviction of attempted bank robbery.130 The Fifth Circuit then cited to
Baker to establish that such a reading was supported by the relevant case
law.131 The Bellew court rJ*/ J//KTU )/ )NT #W)6* JTOM*Jr)M'T NM*)/+l )/
support its interpretation of the text, and to address one of the majority
WM+W(M)*6 -+M1r+l W/0WT+0*? )NT UMQQMW(J)l /Q W/0'MW)M0O r UTQT0Ur0) /Q
attempted bank robbery if proof of actual force is required.132 In particular,
the court focused on the addition of the second paragraph of § 2113(a), which
+TrU* M0 +TJT'r0) -r+)? P3N/T'T+ T0)T+* /+ r))T1-)* )/ T0)T+ r0l qr0K . . . with
intent to commit . . f r0l QTJ/0lf:133 The court surmised that in circumstances
oNT+T r -T+*/0 or* PQ/+ */1T +Tr*/0: Q+(*)+r)TU M0 NM* r))T1-) )/ +ob a bank,
and did not use actual force or intimidation in the failed attempt (as in
Stallworth, Jackson, McFadden, Moore, and Wesley), the second paragraph
of § 2113(a) would serve as a sort of backstop, providing the same harsh
penalty prescribed for robbery or attempted robbery under the first
paragraphStwenty years in prisonSbut without the government having to
prove actual force or intimidation.134 Put simply, if the majority was
concerned about safeguarding the public in such cases, then the second
paragraph of § 2113(a) provided a black-letter solution that sprang from the
plain meaning of the controlling statute, and did not require any sacrifice in
terms of the available penalty.135 Indeed, the Bellew court appeared to be
addressing the majority di+TW)Jl oNT0 M) o+/)Th P)NT )+/(qJM0O +T*(J) /(+
interpretation of the first paragraph of Section 2113 creates . . . is obviated
ql )NT r'rMJrqMJM)l /Q )NT *TW/0U -r+rO+r-N W/'T+M0O *(WN rW)*f:136
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit joined the minority and expanded the
conflict with its decision in United States v. Thornton, holding that under the
first paragraph of § 2113(a), the government must prove actual force and
violence or intimidation in order to sustain a conviction of attempted bank
robbery. 137 Walter Thornton and his accomplice, Tremain Moore, had been
130 Id. at 454 (PWe find the Pactual act of intimidation: reading to be the most natural
reading of the text. This reading is supported by relevant binding case law. We, therefore,
reject the opposing interpretation given this text by our sister circuits.:).
131 Id. at 455.
132 Id. (PThe troubling result our interpretation of the first paragraph of Section 2113
creates, prohibiting conviction under the first paragraph of Section 2113 absent an actual act
of intimidation, is obviated by the availability of the second paragraph covering such acts.:).
133 Id. at 454–55 (noting that the second paragraph of Section 2113(a) was added by
Congress in an effort to cover precisely the sort of events that occurred in this case).
134 Id. at 455.
135 Id. (noting Pthe addition of this paragraph implies that Bellew properly should have
been charged under the second paragraph of Section 2113(a):).
136 Id.
137 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 741 (7th Cir. 2008).
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arrested after plotting to rob the Bank One branch in Berwyn, Illinois.138
They were both convicted of attempted bank robbery in district court, but
Thornton later appealed, arguing that the district court had erred when it
M0*)+(W)TU )NT L(+l P/0 )NT TJT1T0)* /Q r))T1-)TU qr0K +/qqT+l (0UT+ u)NT
first paragraph of] § 2113(a) because the instruction did not require actual
Q/+WT r0U 'M/JT0WT /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0f:139 The Seventh Circuit agreed and
acknowledged the current split, but cited to Baker and Bellew. It noted that
)NT aMQ)N !M+W(M)6* -JrM0 1Tr0M0O r--+/rWN M0 Bellew comported with their
/o0? PoT Tmr1M0T )NT *)r)()/+l )Tm)f:140 P70UT+ r *)+rMON)Q/+or+U +TrUM0O
of § 2113(aih: )NT W/(+) UT)T+1M0TU )Nr) )NT 8r))T1-)6 Jr0O(rOT +TJr)T* /0Jl
)/ )NT )rKM0O r0U 0/) )/ )NT M0)M1MUr)M/0f:141 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
held that actual force and violence or intimidation is required for a conviction
under the first paragraph of § 2113(aih +TOr+UJT** /Q PoNT)NT+ )NT UTfendant
*(WWTTU* uM0 )NT )rKM0Ot /+ QrMJ* ur))T1-)* )/ )rKTt M0 NM* +/qqT+l r))T1-)f:142
^0 +T'T+*M0O 9N/+0)/06* W/0'MW)M/0h )NT ;T'T0)N !M+W(M) rJ*/ /QQT+TU r
qJ(0) r**T**1T0) /Q )NT O/'T+01T0)6*Sr0U ql Tm)T0*M/0h )NT 1rL/+M)l6*S
position on the matter, fla)Jl r**T+)M0O )Nr) M) or* r0 r))T1-) P)/ *)+T)WN
QTUT+rJ Jro )/ W/'T+ r0 rW) )Nr) M* 0/) W+M1M0rJMkTU ql )NT *)r)()T r) M**(Tf:143
The government argues that all that is necessary is that a defendant attempt to intimidate
while attempting to rob a bank. If tNr) oT+T */h r))T1-) o/(JU +TJr)T )/ )NT Pql Q/+WT
r0U 'M/JT0WT /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0: Jr0O(rOT r0U )NT *)r)()T o/(JU Nr'T qTO(0 oM)Nh
P3N/T'T+ r))T1-)* ql Q/+WT r0U 'M/JT0WT /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0 )/ )rKT . . . f: 9NT Pql Q/+WT
r0U 'M/JT0WTh /+ ql M0)M1MUr)M/0: Jr0O(rOT +TJr)T* )/ q/)N P)rKT*: r0U )NT -N+r*T
Pr))T1-)* )/ )rKTf144
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit also pointed out the
availability of the second paragraph of § 2113(a) to cover instances where,
as in Thornton, the defendant is somehow frustrated in the attempt, noting
)Nr)h P9N/+0)/0 W/(JU Nr'T qTT0 -+/*TW()TU (0UT+ )NT *TW/0U -r+rO+r-Nf:145
138 Id. at 743–45.
139 Id. at 745.
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C. WHY THE SPLIT IS REALLY AN EXCEPTION
# WM+W(M) *-JM) TmM*)* PoNT0 )o/ /+ 1/+T WM+W(M)* M0 )NT 70M)TU ;)r)T*
court of appeals reach opposite interpretations /Q QTUT+rJ Jrof:146 A circuit
*-JM) 1MON) rJ)T+0r)TJl qT UTQM0TU r* P*T,(T0WT* /Q W/0QJMW)M0O UTWM*M/0* ql
UMQQT+T0) r--TJJr)T W/(+)* /0 )NT *r1T JTOrJ ,(T*)M/0f:147 Here, the so-called
split regarding the necessary elements of attempted bank robbery under the
first paragraph of § 2113(a) fails under both definitions.
As the case illustrations above demonstrate, the majority never bothers
to engage in any meaningful interpretation of the semantic meaning of the
controlling federal law as written, and in so doing, violates a basic cannon of
statutory interpretationS)NT 0/)M/0 )Nr) Pu)tNT o/+U* /Q r O/'T+0M0O )Tm) r+T
of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the
)Tm) 1Tr0*f:148 Instead, the majority focuses on the elements of an inchoate
crime under the MPC: requisite intent, and a substantial step toward
commission.149
In Thornton, the Seventh Circuit articulates the crux of the problem:
P3T U/ 0/) QM0U )NT*T Wr*T* -T+*(r*M'T qTWr(*T )NTl /1M) r0 r--+/-+Mr)T
*)r)()/+l r0rJl*M*f:150 The absence of appropriate statutory analysis by the
majority circuits at once impeaches the notion of the controversy falling
under the first definition of a true split above, as well as the assertion bymany
JTOrJ *WN/Jr+* )Nr) )NT UM*rO+TT1T0) +T*(J)* Q+/1 Pconflicting methods of
146 Legal Information Institute, Circuit Split. WEX, https:// www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/circuit_split [https://perma.cc/4XSP-8NRW] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
147 Scott Baker & Anup Malani, Do Judges Actually Care About the Law? Evidence from
Circuit Split Data, SEMANTICSCHOLAR 1 (2015), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/10e3/
a47903791073bc7590b5d6dfc79126b3f847.pdf?_ga=2.256810507.1094416143.154821202
6-876376388.1548212026 [https://perma.cc/WMQ8-RZVV].
148 Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,
56 (Thomson/West, 2012) (articulating the PSupremacy-of-Text Principle:).
149 United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant committed an overt act constituting a
substantial step toward commission of bank robbery); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207,
209 (9th Cir. 1990) (PA conviction for attempted bank robbery requires the government to
prove (1) culpable intent, and (2) conduct constituting a substantial step towards the
commission of the crime . . . .:); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984)
(PThe defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward
commission of the crime:) (quoting Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040); United States v. Jackson,
560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (PEither type of conduct, standing alone, was sufficient as a
matter of law to constitute a 8substantial step6 if it strongly corroborated their criminal
purpose.:); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976) (PDefendant must
have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime,
conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant6s criminal intent.:).
150 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008).
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*)r)()/+l M0)T+-+T)r)M/0f:151 Put simply, where one side skips the
interpretation of the statute altogether, there can be no competition.
The controversy also fails to qualify if we attempt to define a true split
in terms of the majority and minority circuits addressing a common legal
question.152 a/+ )NT 1rL/+M)l WM+W(M)*h )NT KTl ,(T*)M/0 M*h PuotNr) W/0*)M)()T*
common-Jro r))T1-)$:153 3NT+Tr*h )NT 1M0/+M)l WM+W(M)* r*Kh P3Nr) r+T )NT
TJT1T0)* /Q r))T1-) (0UT+ )NT W/0)+/JJM0O *)r)()T$:154 These are
fundamentally different questions, demanding fundamentally different
answers and, as we have seen, yielding fundamentally different results.155 It
M* oTJJ T*)rqJM*NTU )Nr)h (0JMKT *)r)T Jroh QTUT+rJ Jro PNr* 0/ OT0T+rJJl
applicable crime of attT1-)h: TmWT-) oNT+T !/0O+T** Nr* *-TWMQMWrJJl
proscribed the attempt and set its punishment.156 Given that the Act
specifically proscribes the attempt and sets its punishmentS:uotN/T'T+h ql
force and violence, or intimidation, takes or attempts to take . . . shall be fined
(0UT+ )NM* )M)JT /+ M1-+M*/0TU 0/) 1/+T )Nr0 )oT0)l lTr+*h /+ q/)N:Sthe
1rL/+M)l6* r--+/rWN M* WJTr+Jl r) /UU* oM)N )NM* T*)rqJM*NTU 1rmM1f157 The
statutory language is neither ambiguous nor vague.158 Nevertheless, instead
of looking to the controlling statute and the specific definition of attempt it
provides, the majority unabashedly ignores the text and pulls its general
UTQM0M)M/0 r0U P)o/-)MT+TU M0,(M+l: Q/+ UT)T+1M0M0O oNr) W/0*)M)()T* Pr0
r))T1-): Q+/1 P)NT uW/11/0 Jrot o+M)M0O* /Q 1r0l UM*)M0O(M*NTU L(+M*)*f:159
9NT 1rL/+M)l6* r--+/rWN rJ*/ r--Tr+* )/ qT r) /UU* oM)N ;(-+T1T
Court precedent. In Carter v. United States, a case involving the relationship
between sections 2113(a) and (b) but which did not directly address the
required elements of attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a), the Court held
)Nr)h P)NT W/11/0 Jro *N/(JU qT M1-/+)TU M0)/ *)r)()/+l )Tm) /0Jl oNT0
151 Supra note 23.
152 Baker & Malani, supra note 147.
153 Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1039 (PSince the question is one likely to present itself to
district courts not infrequently it is prudent to discuss briefly the perplexing problem of
distinguishing 8mere preparation6 for the commission of a crime from an 8attempt.6:).
154 United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2004).
155 Supra Part III, Sections B and C.
156 Charles Doyle, Attempt: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 1–2 (Apr. 6, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9EZ-EDSS].
157 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
158 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL6Y 65,
67 (2011) (Planguage is ambiguous when it has more than one sense; it is vague when its
meaning admits of borderline cases that cannot definitively be ruled in or out of its
meaning.:).
159 United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038,1040 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Congress employs a common-law term, and not when . . . Congress simply
describes an offense analogous to a common-law crime without using
common-law terms.160 9NT+T M* 0/ *(WN P)T+1 /Q r+): Q/(0U M0 & 2113(a).161
^0 W/0)+r*)h )NT 1M0/+M)l6* M0,(M+l PqTOM0u*t r0U T0Uu*t oM)N )NT
*)r)()/+l )Tm)h: oNT+T oT QM0U )NT +TJT'r0) ,(rJMQMT+h Pr))T1-)*h: QJr0KTU qlh
and holding hands with M)* -r+T0)rJ 'T+q*h P)rKT*: r0U P)rKTf:162 Within the
'T+l *)+(W)(+T /Q )NT *T0)T0WTh Pr))T1-)*: M* O+r11r)MWrJJl orJJTU /QQ Q+/1
)NT TJT1T0)* /Q PQ/+WT r0U 'M/JT0WTh /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0h: oNMWN +rM*T* )NT
question, why have some courts, in some cases, attempted to scramble over
it like former East Berliners?163
9NT WJTr+ r0U 'rJMU -/JMWl W/0*MUT+r)M/0 OM+UM0O )NT 1rL/+M)l6* UTWM*M/0*
is essentially the same consideration invoked in the passage and enforcement
of the ActSthe notion that where the defendant has manifested firm criminal
M0)T0) M0 )NT Q/+1 /Q r P*(q*)r0)MrJ *)T-: )/or+U W/11M))M0O )NT W+M1Th Jro
enforcement ought to be able to step in before somebody gets hurt.164
Themajority explicitly acknowledges as much in several of the opinions
discussed above, but it is only when we identify the common facts which
distinguish the majority cases that the true nature of this so-called split is
revealed. In every majority case in which attempted force or attempted
intimidation was found to be sufficient for a conviction, law enforcement
possessed at least some foreknowledge of the crime and the corresponding
opportunity to intervene before anyone was hurt or placed at risk of being
hurt.165 When considered in light of these common facts, we might fairly say
that the statutory ruleSthat actual use of force and violence, or intimidation
is a required element of attempted bank robberySsimply does not apply
under these circumstances. In which case, the disagreement among the
circuits is more accurately categorized as an exception rather than a split, the
triggering circumstances for which are: (1) at least some foreknowledge of
the crime by law enforcement; and (2) the opportunity for law enforcement
to intervene before innocent bystanders are hurt.166
160 Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 265 (2000).
161 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
162 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 2008); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
163 Id. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
164 Supra Part III, Section B; see also United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir.
2005).
165 See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir.
1984); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wesley, 417
F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005).
166 The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines Pexception: as Pa case to which a
rule does not apply.: Exception, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
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In sum, the majority is not simply reading the statute differently and
then applying that interpretation universally regardless of the facts. Instead,
the majority appears to have carved out a common-sense exception to the
statutory rule which only applies under very specific circumstances: where
law enforcement knows a bank robbery is about to be committed and where
innocent bystanders may be put at risk, law enforcement ought to be able to
step in before somebody gets hurt.167
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTION
It goes without saying )Nr) P(0MQ/+1M)l M0 )NT M0)T+-+T)r)M/0 /Q )NT
0r)M/0rJ Jro*: M* r O//U )NM0Oh q() #JTmr0UT+ _r1MJ)/0 *rMU M) r0lorl M0
Federalist No. 80.168 Hamilton warned that when the federal courts disagree
P/'T+ )NT *r1T Wr(*T*h r+M*M0O Q+/1 )NT *r1T Jro*h: l/( Nr'T Pa hydra in
government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can
-+/WTTUf:169 However, to the extent that I have now characterized this
difference of opinion among the circuits as an exception to the statutory rule
rather than a split, we can no longer say, strictly speaking, that the circuits
are in direct opposition. It would be more accurate to say that the majority
is merely exercising an ad hoc exception in service to a completely valid
policy consideration when specific circumstances warrant.170 Put another
orlh M) M* 0/) 0TWT**r+MJl )NT 1rL/+M)l6* W/0WT+0 Q/+ -+/)TW)M0O M00/WT0)
bystanders that needs addressing here, nor the outcomes in various cases
where that consideration has been paramount. Rather, it is the manner in
which the majority arrives at those outcomesSql PqT0UuM0Ot r QTUT+rJ
*)r)()T:Sthat is most troublesome.171
>0T )NM0O oT Wr0 *rQTJl *rl M* )Nr) !/0O+T** U/T* 0/) Wr*) )NT 0r)M/06*
laws in play-dough, nor is such pliability necessarily conducive to
_r1MJ)/06* +T,(M*M)T P(0MQ/+1M)lf:172 Regardless of how we classify this
particular controversy, as a split or an exception, the question remains: how
qT*) )/ Nr+1/0MkT )NT 1rL/+M)l6* 'rJMU -/JMWl W/0*MUT+r)M/0Sprotecting
webster.com/dictionary/exception [https://perma.cc/CRN7-TSQB] (last visited Jan. 22,
2019).
167 See Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038; Jackson, 560 F.2d 112; McFadden, 739 F.2d 149;
Moore, 921 F.2d 207; Wesley, 417 F.3d 612.
168 THE FEDERALISTNO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
169 Id.
170 See supra Part III, Section B.
171 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that Pwe cannot
bend the statute simply to accommodate the government6s zeal to obtain stiffer penalties:).
172 THE FEDERALISTNO. 80, supra note 168.
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innocents from harmSwith the cast-iron letter of federal law? There are
several possible solutions.
A. AN ALTERNATIVE FOR PROSECUTORS: THE SECOND PARAGRAPH
OF § 2113(A)
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits offer the most immediately practicable
means of avoiding further confusion: where the government cannot prove
actual use of force and violence, or intimidation, the government should
simply charge the defendant under the second paragraph of § 2113(a), as
opposed to charging the defendant under the first paragraph.173 As the
minority has noted, under the second paragraph pertaining to unlawful entry
oM)N )NT M0)T0) )/ W/11M) Pr0l QTJ/0lh: )NT 1rL/+M)l6* -/JMWl W/0*MUT+r)M/0*
are arguably still served, and there is no difference in terms of available
penalties.174 This approach is unsatisfying, however, because it relies entirely
/0 )NT UM*W+T)M/0 /Q QTUT+rJ -+/*TW()/+* r0U QrMJ* )/ Nr+1/0MkT )NT 1rL/+M)l6*
decisions with the letter of the law.
Additionally, since the second paragraph of § 2113(a) deals specifically
oM)N Pr0l/0T oN/ T0)T+* /+ r))T1-)* )/ T0)T+: r qr0Kh M) r--ears that in cases
like Wesley, where no attempt is made to actually enter the bank, defendants
who otherwise fully intend to go through with the crime and pose some
danger to the public, might escape liability (and a possible twenty-year prison
sentence), under the Act.175 It is worth noting, however, that a defendant like
Wesley, who admits to conspiracy to commit bank robbery, does not
completely avoid criminal liability under federal law.176
B. THE SUPREME COURT COULD GRANT CERTIORARI
The Supreme Court has already granted certiorari in a number of cases
involving the Bank Robbery Act, but none have directly addressed the
173 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746.
174 Id.
175 Supra Part II.
176 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012):
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof [including a federally insured
bank] in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Id. See also United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 149 (4th Cir. 2016), cert denied, 137 S.
Ct. 164 (2016) (defendant was convicted of Pconspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371:).
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required elements of attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a).177 While the
continued presence of a split is generally a catalyst, the certiorari process is
notoriously cryptic, and only a small percentage of the splits that occur are
actually resolved by the Court. 178 Splits that involve multiple circuits, as
here, tend to get more attention, but the longer they remain unresolved, the
less liKTJl )NT !/(+) M* )/ M0)T+'T0Th r0U )NM* /0T Nr* qTT0 P-T+W/Jr)M0O: 0/o
for over a decade.179
#* -+T*T0)Jl W/0*)M)()TUh )NT !/(+) M* Pql-and-large a textualist court,
Nr'M0O rU/-)TU 1(WN /Q )NT Jr)T ](*)MWT #0)/0M0 ;WrJMr6* L(UMWMrJ
+Tr*/0M0Of:180 Therefore, if the Court does grant certiorari at some point, the
*1r+) 1/0Tl o/(JU qT /0 )NT !/(+) *MUM0O oM)N )NT 1M0/+M)l WM+W(M)*6
textualist approach to interpreting the first paragraph of § 2113(a), and a
holding that proof of actual force or intimidation is necessary for a conviction
of attempted bank robbery.181 By the same token, as we have seen in cases
like District of Columbia v. Heller, the smart money is not always the right
money, even where the text appears unambiguous on its face.182
Rather than choosing between conflicting interpretations of the statute,
the Court could simply recognize the public safety exception already being
utilized by the majority circuits. It has done so before, and under broadly
177 E.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 274 (2000) (holding that the offense of
taking and carrying away, with intent to steal or purloin, any thing of value exceeding $1,000
belonging to, or in the possession of, any bank was not a lesser included offense of charged
offense); Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 362 (1983) (holding that the Bank Robbery Act
was not limited to common-law larceny, but also proscribed the crime of obtaining money
under false pretenses); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 (1957) (holding that when
Congress amended Federal Bank Robbery Act to make not only robbery but also entry for
such purpose a crime, it intended that maximum punishment for robbery should remain at
twenty years and that no additional punishment for entry to commit such robbery should be
imposed).
178 Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the Courts of Appeals, 1, 10
(June 25, 2015) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2623304 [https://perma.cc/CGD2-FXVM] (PIn
this dataset [2005–2013], there are 418 conflicts involving 2082 cases. As of 2013, only 42 of
these conflicts had been resolved by the Supreme Court.:).
179 Id. at 15 (PAs the number of years increases, most conflicts remain unresolved.:).
180 Ryan Lovelace, Elena Kagan: The Supreme Court is a +textualist court’ that reasons
more like Scalia than Breyer, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (October 16, 2017, 7:04 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/elena-kagan-the-supreme-court-is-a-textualist-court-
that-reasons-more-like-scalia-than-breyer [https://perma.cc/7GQR-PJ8N].
181 Supra Part III, Section B.
182 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–78 (2008) (PThe Amendment6s
prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second
part, the operative clause.:).
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similar circumstances.183 In carving out an exception to the requirement that
police issue Miranda warnings, the Court noted )Nr) PW/0WT+0 Q/+ public
safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the
-+/-NlJrW)MW +(JT*f:184
C. THE CONGRESSIONAL OPTION: CODIFYING THE EXCEPTION
Congress has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to amend the Bank
Robbery Act as needed.185 An additional clarifying amendment on the
r))T1-) ,(T*)M/0 Nr* )NT -/)T0)MrJ )/ N/0/+ )NT 1rL/+M)l6* -/JMWl
consideration, while also respecting long-established principles of canonical
statutory interpretation.186 If lawmakers want attempted force or intimidation
to be sufficient, as the majority asserts, then the hypothetical change
suggested by the Seventh Circuit in ThorntonS:uotN/T'T+ r))T1-)* ql Q/+WT
and violence or intimidation to take . . . f:Swould certainly do the trick.187
If Congress prefers to make the actual use of force or intimidation a
necessary element, as the minority maintains, it could clarify the first
paragraph of § 2113(a) by adding the following -+/'M*M/0? P^0 /+UT+ )/
sustain a conviction of attempted bank robbery, the government must show
r0U -+/'T rW)(rJ (*T /Q Q/+WT r0U 'M/JT0WTh /+ M0)M1MUr)M/0f:
Arguably, it is our elected representatives who should be leading the
charge when it comes to setting societal priorities like protecting innocent
bystanders, not the courts.188 !/0O+T** 1rKT* )NT Jro* r0U )NT W/(+)* P*rl
oNr) )NT Jro M*f:189 It follows then, that the courts should not be using policy
considerations, valid or not, to obviate the will of Congress. As Hamilton
*)r)TUh )NM* M* r +TWM-T Q/+ PW/0)+rUMW)M/0 r0U W/0Q(*M/0: 0/) L(*) oM)N +T*-TW)
to § 2113(a), but any and all federal laws moving forward.190
183 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (recognizing a Ppublic safety:
exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect6s answers may
be admitted into evidence).
184 Id. at 653.
185 Supra Part II.
186 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2008) (PIn analyzing the
first paragraph of § 2113(a), we 8begin by examining the text.6:) (quoting Carter v. United
States, 530 U.S. 255, 271 (2000)).
187 Id. at 746.
188 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (PAll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.:).
189 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (PIt is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.:).
190 THE FEDERALISTNO. 80, supra note 168.
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For these reasons, and because a Supreme Court resolution would likely
allow certain defendants who still pose a risk to escape liability, statutory
amendment by Congress may be the best possible solution for all concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
The so-called split regarding the use of force requirement for attempted
bank robbery under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is really an
exception to the statutory rule, the triggering circumstances for which are (1)
at least some foreknowledge of the crime by law enforcement, and (2) the
corresponding opportunity for law enforcement to intervene before
somebody gets hurt. This difference of opinion among the circuits has been
repeatedly framed as a consequence of competing methods of statutory
interpretation, but as this comment demonstrates, only one sideSthe
minoritySbothers to engage in any meaningful linguistic interpretation of
the statute.191 In fact, the majority has skipped the textual analysis altogether,
Nr* MO0/+TU !/0O+T**6* -+T*W+MqTU UTQM0M)M/0 /Q r))T1-)TU qr0K +/qqT+lh r0U
has substituted its own common-law definition of attempt harvested from the
MPC. In holding that attempted force or intimidation is sufficient for a
conviction, the majority has a valid policy consideration in mindSprotecting
innocent bystanders from harmSbut in attempting to make this policy-
driven exception the rule, the majority invites system-wide unpredictability
and confusion related to the application of federal law.192
Given these circumstances, a valid policy concern at odds with the
statutory text, and absent the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court to
either to interpret the statute or recognize the exception, Congress should
amend the statute to clarify its position on the required elements of attempted
bank robbery.
191 Supra Part III, Sections B and C.
192 THE FEDERALISTNO. 10, supra note 168
